In the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the European Union (EU) has implemented its long-awaited 17th sanctions package as of 2025. This new package introduces a series of comprehensive measures aimed at intensifying economic pressure on Russia, while also incorporating mechanisms to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via third countries such as Türkiye.
Contents of the 17th Sanctions Package
While building upon previous sanctions, the 17th package introduces several unique features. One of its primary targets is the so-called “shadow fleet”a covert network of tankers used by Russia to export oil. Although the EU had already blacklisted 153 oil tankers, restricting their access to EU ports and services, the new package adds 189 more vessels, bringing the total number to around 350 ships under sanctions.
Another significant dimension of the new package is the further restriction of Russia’s access to defense industry components and warfare technology. As part of this initiative, 75 individuals and entities affiliated with Russia’s military and industrial complex have been added to the sanctions list. Moreover, new restrictions have been introduced on the trade of dual-use goods products that can serve both civilian and military purposes. For instance, certain EU-origin chemicals that could potentially be used in missile manufacturing are now fully prohibited for export to Russia. Similarly, critical machinery parts and tool components with potential military applications have been added to the list of banned items. These steps aim to undermine Russia’s capacity to procure advanced technologies and materials vital for its war effort.
One of the most notable innovations in this sanctions package is the introduction of direct measures against the circumvention of sanctions through third countries. This time, the EU has targeted third-country companies found to be involved in violating the sanctions regime. Approximately 30 companies engaged in the trade of dual-use goods have been sanctioned. These companies are reportedly based in countries such as Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and the United Arab Emirate nations considered critical transit points for goods flowing to Russia. Around a dozen of these sanctioned companies are registered in Türkiye, the UAE, Serbia, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan. These companies will now face restrictions on access to the EU market, asset freezes, and exclusion from the EU’s financial system. Through these measures, the EU continues to shift its focus toward preventing the evasion of existing sanctions via third-party intermediaries.
Potential Impact on Turkish Companies
The 17th sanctions package is expected to have both direct and indirect effects on Turkish companies. In recent years, Türkiye has not frozen the commercial and political ties with Russia which led to be positioned as a key commercial channel from western point of view.
The EU’s sanctions targeting Russia’s shadow fleet may cause indirect disruptions in energy transportation and logistics. Some oil tankers operating in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, including those passing through the Turkish straits, have been blacklisted. These vessels will be denied insurance and port services, likely resulting in increased transportation costs and potential delays. Given that Türkiye requires vessels to be insured for passage through its straits, sanctioned tankers may face difficulties obtaining coverage, potentially disrupting oil shipments from Russia to Türkiye or via Türkiye to third countries.
Additionally, the export ban on certain high-tech products and machinery parts to Russia may negatively affect Turkish manufacturers producing such goods. This development presents risks and potential restructuring challenges for Turkish companies involved in energy logistics and the supply of industrial products.
While the EU’s 17th sanctions package intensifies pressure on Russia, it simultaneously sends a clear message to third countries like Türkiye regarding compliance with sanctions. Given Türkiye’s close economic ties with the EU, these measures are likely to have a notable impact. Turkish businesses will need to navigate a delicate balance between maintaining trade relations with Russia and preserving their economic and regulatory ties with the EU.
